How should Shipowners Navigating Ambiguity in an Escalating Maritime Security Environment?

Statements such as “huge escalation as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Red Sea are closing” ,“the U.S. is ready for a massive attack against Iran, bigger than ever before”, “Iran warns of an ‘eye for an eye’ response if the U.S. follows through on its threats” and “Ukraine reports striking 180 merchant vessels in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea”—when combined with the increasingly dominant style of sensationalistic headlines and bullet-point assertions from media outlets and some security commentators—do not reduce ambiguity. They amplify it. These formulations tend to generate a panic-tinged perception of an impending “perfect storm” and systemic chaos among public opinion and among the markets that are directly or indirectly exposed.

The shipping market is now affected on two distinct levels. First, there has been a measurable rise in actual attacks on merchant vessels during July 2026 in several theaters. Second, the market is influenced by strategic information campaigns of the kind illustrated above — campaigns whose primary purpose is often to shape perceptions and behavior rather than to convey a precise, balanced assessment of reality. Operating under this dual pressure is inherently difficult. The practical question for shipowners is therefore: how should these developments shape decisions and posture going forward?

First requirement: informed contextual understanding

Shipowners should begin with a clear grasp of the strategic context rather than reacting to isolated headlines.

The increase in Ukrainian and Russian attacks on shipping in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea, the continuation of Iranian attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and the renewed Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea follow a coherent and long-anticipated trajectory. These developments have been expected and, in professional circles, previously communicated to shipping companies that maintain serious security advisory relationships. They conform to some of the most fundamental and enduring principles of warfare.

Sun Tzu, writing approximately 2,500 years ago in “The Art of War”, observed that “all warfare is based on deception” and that a recurring operational imperative is "to cut an adversary off from vital resources—water, stores", or, in modern terms, oil and gas. Carl von Clausewitz, roughly two centuries ago in “On War”, distinguished the unchanging nature of war (a duel shaped by politics, human emotion, and chance) from its evolving character (which changes with technology, tactics, and the means available). These classical insights remain directly applicable.

Consequently, no professional security advisor should express genuine surprise at the pattern of July’s events, nor should such surprise be conveyed to decision-makers. It is entirely logical that Ukraine, now having secured a measure of operational initiative on the ground, sea and air, would seek to further sever oil and gas supply lines to the Russian forces on Crimea for tactical reasons, but also to degrade the broader Russian economy and war-supporting machinery on a strategic level that remain heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports. Ukraine is engaged in a struggle for national survival, not a commercial negotiation.

When it comes to Russia, they have attacked shipping in the Black Sea trading on Ukraine since the first day of their invasion - with varying intensity though. Mostly for the same reason.

Likewise, as major U.S. combat operations have re-emerged in and over Iran in July, it is consistent with established patterns that Iran would exploit the strategic initiative it has held since February to further disrupt a significant share of global oil and gas flows. At higher levels of escalation—such as those now observed—Iran would also be expected to activate its principal strategic reserve forces (proxy actors, notably the Houthis in Yemen) in order to open or intensify a second front against selected shipping targets. The Iranian regime, like Ukraine, is also operating under existential pressure rather than under the logic of ordinary commercial bargaining.

I offer no advice to the two great powers principally involved—the United States and Russia—on how they might improve their respective positions, and certainly none to Russia. But the observable fact is that both have, for a sustained period, been responding to the initiatives of their opponents. Both systems also display a tendency to reward loyalty over unwelcome truth. Some analysts regard this as a reliable recipe for long-term strategic failure, regardless of the number of tactical successes achieved. Time will determine the validity of that assessment.

Second requirement: decisions grounded in professional Intelligence forecasts, not in historical analogy or individual incidents

Shipowners should base operational choices on rigorous, forward-looking Intelligence assessments derived from structural analysis rather than on the simple extrapolation of past events.

A core principle within the professional Intelligence Community that supports strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making is that history does not literally repeat itself. As Dr. Kjetil Hatlebrekke has examined in “The Problem of Secret Intelligence” (2019) in relation to the problem of induction, reliance on historical precedent alone systematically misleads. Decision-makers who fall into this trap risk focusing on the wrong threats, in the wrong places, at the wrong times, while overlooking higher-probability future developments that are more likely to affect their operations.

Consequently, an increase in the number of security incidents in a given area does not automatically necessitate a change in the prevailing threat level. When a threat level has already been assessed as like HIGH, the occurrence of individual incidents is consistent with the forecast probability. The appropriate input for a company’s security risk assessment is therefore the structured threat forecast itself, not the discrete events that have already been anticipated within it.

Implications for the private maritime security market

Looking ahead, private maritime security companies that demonstrate the capacity to adapt to emerging threat vectors—particularly unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles, and related systems—by delivering professional, effective, and tailored mitigation services are most likely to become the preferred tactical security providers for shipowners.